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INTRODUCTION 
ater pollution is pervasive, but tracking a pollutant back to its 
source can be difficult or impossible. When a firm takes 
actions to maximize its profits, but these actions cause pollution or 
environmental degradation, the firm has caused a “negative 
externality.”1 A firm creates a negative externality when it decides to 
engage in a production process and takes into account only its private 
costs without consideration of the pollution costs that others must bear. 
In this case, the firm has imposed a negative externality onto other 
members of society, lowering aggregate economic welfare. Economics 
teaches that firms causing such “negative externalities” should be taxed 
or fined to “internalize” costs they cause, thus ensuring market 
efficiency.2 Environmental regulation and remediation requirements 
can mitigate or prevent negative externalities by forcing firms to 
internalize the costs of their pollution through the use of monetary 
penalties for environmental damage. Such penalties cause firms to 
include environmental costs in their decision-making processes and 
thus take such costs into account before deciding on a production 
technology. 
Consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose that 
reformulated gasoline (RFG) with methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) 
costs $1.00 per gallon to produce while RFG with ethanol costs $1.03. 
However, MTBE causes $0.08 per gallon in real damage to water 
resources and health. If the firm considers only its private production 
costs and profits absent the pollution externality, the firm will choose 
MTBE because it is $0.03 cheaper per gallon. On the other hand, if the 
firm believes that it will be held responsible for remediation of 
environmental damage caused by its decision, it will adopt ethanol 
because ethanol is $0.05 per gallon less expensive than MTBE 
inclusive of remediation costs. Remediation costs imposed by the 
government or the legal system add a real cost to producing gasoline 
1 See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 661–64 
(Pearson, 8th ed. 2013). 
2 See, e.g., id. at 667–78. 
W 
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with MTBE rather than ethanol, thus forcing firms to internalize the 
harm their decisions impose on other members of society. 
The State of New Hampshire was one of the many states affected by 
water pollution caused by MTBE gasoline. In 2003, the State filed a 
lawsuit in an effort to cause the responsible parties to pay for the 
remediation costs of the water pollution.3 In 2013, following the 
longest trial in state court history, a New Hampshire jury found 
ExxonMobil responsible for the widespread presence of MTBE in the 
state’s drinking water and awarded a $236 million verdict in favor of 
the State.4 In 2015, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the 
jury’s verdict.5 
The State’s expert economist used a market share liability approach 
to allocate the water pollution costs among the responsible parties.6 
This liability allocation method was granted by the trial court and 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.7 In this Article, we 
discuss the role played by market share liability in the New Hampshire 
MTBE litigation. We examine the history of market share liability in 
litigation involving a number of products, as well as the strengths and 
weaknesses of market share liability in other areas of product liability 
litigation. We also discuss how market shares can be weighted to reflect 
the relative damages caused by similar—but not identical—products. 
I 
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY 
A. Methodology 
Market share liability is a method of allocating liability among 
potential tortfeasors based on their market shares in product liability 
litigation. Market share liability has been adopted when consumers are 
harmed by fungible goods whose manufacturers cannot be identified. 
The reasoning behind market share liability theory is that while a 
particular manufacturer may not necessarily cause a specific harm, the 
manufacturer’s probability of harming a given plaintiff equals its 
market share. Hence, the plaintiff is protected from the risk of harm 
3 State v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266, 274 (N.H. 2015). 
4 Id. at 273. 
5 Id. at 294–95. 
6 Id. at 297–98. The authors served as testifying and consulting economists, respectively, 
to the State of New Hampshire. 
7 Id. at 299. 
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rather than from physical harm, while a defendant manufacturer is 
responsible for the “tortious imposition of risk.”8 According to leading 
torts scholars, market share liability is derived from a “risk-based 
conception of tort liability” designed to reduce unreasonable risks 
through a “deterrence-based torts system.”9 
The traditional causation rule that requires a plaintiff to prove direct 
causation in order to be entitled to compensation was first modified in 
the influential Summers v. Tice case.10 In this case, defendants—rather 
than plaintiffs—were held to have the burden of proving causation if 
the following conditions were met: “(1) all possible ‘culpable’ entities 
are joined in the action; (2) each defendant has an opportunity to 
exculpate itself by proving that its conduct did not cause the plaintiff’s 
injury; and (3) each instrumentality that may have injured the plaintiff 
carried a uniform risk of harm.”11 
B. DES Litigation 
In the 1980s, the less strict causation rule adopted in Summers was 
expanded into the market share liability framework in a series of cases 
relating to diethylstilbestrol (DES) product liability. 
1. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,12 the California Supreme Court
modified the causation rule in Summers that “a plaintiff join all possible 
culpable entities to the action” and instead required that plaintiffs must 
join “only a ‘substantial share’ of such entities.”13 According to the 
principles of market share liability set forth in Sindell, which were 
based in part on an innovative comment in the Fordham Law Review 
by Naomi Sheiner,14 each defendant manufacturer was responsible for 
its share of DES sold in a given geographic area even if the plaintiff 
could not trace her injuries back to that manufacturer’s product. As the 
court stated, “Under this approach, each manufacturer’s liability would 
8 Mark Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share 
Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447, 449 (2006). 
9 Id. 
10 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 1–5 (Cal. 1948). 
11 Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share Liability 
in Blood Products Litigation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 883, 885–86 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
12 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
13 Klein, supra note 11, at 886. 
14 See Naomi Sheiner, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 963 (1978). 
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approximate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own 
products.”15  
DES was a synthetic hormone marketed from 1947 to 1971 to 
pregnant women for prevention of miscarriage. Research revealed in 
1971 that DES taken by pregnant women can cause adenocarcinoma in 
their female offspring many years later. Many of the plaintiffs could 
not identify the manufacturers of the DES taken by their mothers 
because there were over 200 manufacturers of the generic drug and so 
many years had passed. Plaintiff Judith Sindell commenced a class 
action against eleven manufacturers of DES alleging their joint and 
several liability for cooperating to market DES as a safe and effective 
drug for prevention of miscarriage. Ms. Sindell’s claim was dismissed 
by the trial court because she was not able to identify the exact 
defendant manufacturer(s) that made the DES taken by her mother.16 
However, the Supreme Court of California reversed the trial court’s 
decision, concluding that “alternative liability”17 should be broadened 
into market share liability under which the burden of identification 
shifts to the defendant if the plaintiff “establishes a prima facie case on 
every element of the claim except for identification of the actual 
tortfeasors, and the plaintiff has joined the manufacturers of a 
‘substantial share’ of the DES market.”18 The defendants are then 
severally responsible for the share of the judgment representative of 
their contribution to the market when the injury occurred. Each 
defendant was given the opportunity to exculpate itself if it could prove 
that it did not make the DES that resulted in the injury.19 
The two key factors that prevented a DES victim from identifying 
the manufacturer of the DES taken by her mother were the long latency 
period and the fungible characteristics of DES.20 The court in Sindell 
adopted market share liability based on the uniform characteristics of 
DES. The court allowed alteration of the principle followed in Summers 
15 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 612. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 598. The California Supreme Court defined “alternative liability” as follows: 
“Plaintiff places primary reliance upon cases which hold that if a party cannot identify which 
of two or more defendants caused an injury, the burden of proof may shift to the defendants 
to show that they were not responsible for the harm. This principle is sometimes referred to 
as the ‘alternative liability’ theory.” Id.  
18 Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d at 295. 
19 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 602. 
20 David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES Cases: The Unwarranted Erosion 
of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 771, 771–72 (1991). 
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on the ground that all DES was manufactured using the same formula 
by all defendants and the plaintiff could not identify the tortfeasor.21 
The Supreme Court of California’s decision to adopt a market share 
liability framework was primarily based on the following two 
arguments: (1) the damages associated with the injury suffered by an 
innocent plaintiff should be compensated by negligent defendants; (2) 
because the manufacturer is the most capable of controlling the product 
defects and of announcing the hazardous consequences, good public 
policy requires that manufacturers be incentivized to produce safer 
products by imposing liability on them. Under the circumstances of the 
case, a given defendant’s risk of injuring the plaintiff can be quantified 
reasonably as the defendant’s share of the total DES sold by all the 
defendants for a particular indication. Each defendant is liable for the 
judgment apportioned based on its market share, and such apportioned 
liability translates into the defendant’s responsibility for the harm 
resulting from its own DES.22 
Finally, in Sindell, the defendants did not necessarily have 
knowledge of the adverse effects of the drug DES at the time they sold 
the product, but they were found liable for damages based on their 
market shares.23 In his dissent, Judge Richardson argued that assigning 
liability to the drug companies “may well prove to be extremely 
shortsighted from the standpoint of broad social policy.”24 From an 
economic perspective, requiring that firms have knowledge of the 
adverse effects of a product at the time of sale would incentivize firms 
to avoid gaining such knowledge. Thus, from an economic perspective, 
the court in Sindell created the efficient incentive for firms to take 
actions to understand the risks of their products. However, even if firms 
21 Klein, supra note 11, at 900. 
22 Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d at 295. 
23 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 612. 
24 Id. at 620 (“Who is to say whether, and at what time and in what form, the drug 
industry upon which the majority now fastens this blanket liability, may develop a miracle 
drug critical to the diagnosis, treatment, or, indeed, cure of the very disease in question? It 
is counterproductive to inflict civil damages upon all manufacturers for the side effects and 
medical complications which surface in the children of the users a generation after ingestion 
of the drugs, particularly when, at the time of their use, the drugs met every fair test and 
medical standard then available and applicable. Such a result requires of the pharmaceutical 
industry a foresight, prescience and anticipation far beyond the most exacting standards of 
the relevant scientific disciplines. In effect, the majority requires the pharmaceutical 
research laboratory to install a piece of new equipment—the psychic’s crystal ball.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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fail to understand and disclose such risks at the time of sale, economic 
efficiency requires that they be held liable for damages. 
2. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories
In a subsequent DES case, the Washington Supreme Court in Martin
v. Abbott Laboratories25 formulated what it called the “market share
alternate liability” theory, challenging the market share liability theory 
adopted in the Sindell case. The principle under the theory is that the 
plaintiff need accuse only one manufacturer of DES, but that particular 
manufacturer is responsible only for its own market share, finding the 
“substantial share” in the Sindell case was ill defined.26 The court gave 
the defendants the opportunity to show they were not liable by 
demonstrating that they did not (1) manufacture the particular type of 
DES that the plaintiff’s mother took; (2) market DES in the applicable 
geographic market; or (3) market DES during the applicable time 
period.27 The remaining defendants were assigned equal shares of the 
market associated with the plaintiff’s damages to comprise 100%. 
Defendants were allowed to challenge such automatic assignment of 
shares and present their actual market share in the applicable area. If 
the defendants’ proven shares were less than 100% total, the plaintiff 
would be entitled to less than 100% of the damages.28 
3. Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co.
A further version of market share liability called the “risk
contribution theory” was formulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
in Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co.29 The rationale behind this theory was that 
every defendant contributed to the risk of harm suffered by every 
plaintiff, and therefore each defendant should bear the cost of an extent 
of fault. The court intended to impose liability on all the defendant drug 
manufacturers for the harm caused by their products so that they would 
be inclined to conduct sufficient safety tests on their drugs. 30 The court 
25 Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984) (en banc). 
26 Kenneth R. Lepage, Lead-Based Paint Litigation and the Problem of Causation: 
Toward a Unified Theory of Market Share Liability, 37 B.C. L. REV. 155, 161–62 (1995). 
27 Id. at 162. 
28 Id. 
29 Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 
(1984). 
30 Debra L. Scammon & Mary Jane Sheffet, Market Share Liability: An Analysis Since 
Sindell, 11 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 1, 5 (1992). 
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directed the jury to calculate the damages amount due each defendant 
using an apportionment of the total liability amount based on each 
defendant’s proportional causal negligence.31 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not follow market share liability 
under Sindell in its apportionment of judgment on the ground that it 
would be difficult to determine the correct national market shares for 
all the potential defendant manufacturers even though the theory 
provides a fair method of apportionment.32 The court, however, agreed 
with the principal under Sindell that defendants pay damages 
attributable to their negligence or strict liability even in the absence of 
a causal link to the specific product they produced.33 
The court in Collins found that defendant manufacturers were more 
capable of covering the cost of injuries than plaintiffs and, therefore, 
did not require plaintiffs to identify all the responsible manufacturers.34 
The court concluded that a plaintiff needed to identify only one 
defendant and the plaintiff could be fully compensated by that 
defendant.35 The court, however, encouraged a plaintiff to identify 
multiple defendants so that she would have a higher chance of 
collecting damages in the case that a defendant is judgment proof.36 
The Collins court directed the jury to calculate the damages amount 
for each defendant manufacturer according to Wisconsin’s existing 
doctrine called “comparative negligence statute.”37 This doctrine calls 
for apportionment of the total liability amount based on each 
defendant’s proportional causal negligence. 
The Collins court directed the jury to take into account the following 
factors in calculating each defendant’s share of liability: (1) any testing 
done for safety and effectiveness of DES in the intended indication; (2) 
the magnitude of a defendant’s role in having FDA approve DES for 
the intended indication; (3) a defendant’s market share; (4) whether the 
defendant took a leading role or a passive role in the production and 
marketing of DES; (5) announcements given by a defendant about 
hazards associated with DES; (6) volume of DES sold by the defendant 
after its hazards were known; and (7) any effort made by a defendant 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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to minimize the injuries to consumers.38 Hence, the court’s 
apportionment method entailed a defendant’s market share as a base 
but then applied other factors to achieve what the court regarded was 
the best representation of a defendant’s risk of injuring consumers.39 
4. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.
Another version of market share liability was formulated by the New
York Court of Appeals in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.40 The court used 
firms’ shares in the national DES market to allocate defendants’ 
liability. The court did not allow any defendant to exculpate itself by 
demonstrating that it did not (1) manufacture the exact type of DES 
taken by the plaintiff’s mother; (2) sell DES during the applicable time 
period; or (3) sell DES in the applicable geographic area.41 The court 
determined that allocating plaintiffs’ damages based on defendants’ 
national market shares was appropriate because this would take into 
account defendants’ total liability associated with producing and 
marketing the defective product.42 As for culpability, the court ruled 
that a defendant manufacturer cannot be less guilty just because it 
marketed more distinguishable pills or marketed in limited stores.43 The 
court determined that the defendants’ liability for the plaintiffs’ 
damages be several only and cannot add up to 100% unless all the DES 
manufacturers have been identified as defendants.44 
II 
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE V. HESS CORP. 
A. Overview of Case 
In 1990, an amendment to the Federal Clean Air Act mandated that 
an oxygenate be used in gasoline to reduce gasoline emissions if certain 
national air quality standards were not met in a particular geographic 
area.45 The amendment required the oxygen content of the gasoline be 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 944 (1989). 
41 Lepage, supra note 26, at 163. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 State v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266, 273 (N.H. 2015). 
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at least 2.0% by weight.46 The Reformulated Gasoline Program (RFG 
Program) was subsequently introduced by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate the manufacturing of gasoline, 
thus ensuring the gasoline would include the required amount of any 
oxygenate.47 One of the potential oxygenates was a gasoline additive 
called MTBE, which increases gasoline’s octane levels.48 While RFG 
was required in certain metropolitan areas where high concentrations 
of ambient ozone were prevalent, other areas, including New 
Hampshire, could choose to participate in the program for credit toward 
mandatory reduction of emissions.49 
New Hampshire began to participate in the RFG Program in 1991.50 
Gasoline containing MTBE was available throughout the state from 
1995 to 2006.51 During the 1997–1999 time period, studies done by the 
New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, as well as 
investigations conducted in Maine and California, addressed concerns 
about the effects of MTBE on groundwater, and a standard regarding 
the contaminant level for MTBE in drinking water and groundwater 
was developed and enforced.52 
In 2000, the EPA warned that MTBE is a pollutant that is not only 
highly soluble in water and travels farther than other gasoline 
constituents but is also highly resistant to biodegradation.53 
Remediating groundwater contaminated with MTBE gasoline is 
significantly more costly than remediating groundwater contaminated 
with non-MTBE gasoline.54 After various efforts were made by New 
Hampshire to remove MTBE gasoline from the market from 2001 to 
2004, Congress finally terminated the requirement for an oxygenate 
and mandated ethanol usage in 2005.55 
New Hampshire filed a lawsuit in 2003 against a number of parties 
including gasoline suppliers, refiners, and chemical manufacturers, 
46 Id. at 274. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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alleging that MTBE caused groundwater contamination.56 ExxonMobil 
was the only party not to settle with the State, and the case went to trial 
in 2013.57 The jury sided with the State on all counts: negligence, strict 
liability for design defect, and strict liability for failure to warn.58 
Exxon’s position was that it developed its MTBE gasoline in 
compliance with the state of the art, the State was aware of the hazards 
associated with MTBE gasoline, and Exxon gave sufficient warnings 
of the hazards to distributors.59 However, the jury rejected Exxon’s 
defense.60 The jury found that Exxon did not adequately prove (1) that 
a party other than the State or Exxon was solely responsible for the 
harm; (2) the State’s misconduct was responsible for the harm; or (3) 
at least some or all of the damages caused by Exxon should be allocated 
to other nonparties.61 
The State was awarded $816.8 million in total damages comprising 
$142.1 million for past cleanup costs, $218.2 million for assessment 
and cleanup of 228 high-risk sites, $305.8 million for sampling 
drinking water wells, and $150.6 million for treatment of MTBE-
contaminated drinking water wells at or above the threshold 
contaminant level.62 The trial court (the State of New Hampshire 
Superior Court) determined Exxon’s portion of the total damages to be 
$236.4 million based on Exxon’s market share of 28.94% for MTBE 
gasoline supplied in New Hampshire during the time frame in 
question.63 
B. Industry Background and the State’s Allegations 
The gasoline industry operates at several levels: oil production, 
gasoline refining, transportation (via waterways and pipelines) from 
refiners to storage terminals, and transportation (via tanker trucks) from 
storage terminals to retail gasoline stations.64 During transportation by 
56 The authors served as testifying and consulting experts, respectively, for the State of 
New Hampshire. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 274–75. 
60 Id. at 274–75. 
61 Id. at 275.  
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Gasoline Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energy 
explained/print.php?page=gasoline_where (last updated Nov. 8, 2018). 
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pipeline or barge and during storage in bulk terminals, gasoline 
produced by different refiners becomes mixed together or 
“commingled.”65 Once gasoline produced in different refineries 
becomes commingled, any individual volume of gasoline cannot be 
traced back to a particular refinery.66 This is relevant from a market 
share perspective because it means that one cannot, even in principle, 
trace the gasoline produced in a given refinery to a given retail gas 
station, much less to a plume of MTBE-contaminated groundwater. 
This fact holds even if the refinery and the retail gasoline station are 
owned by the same firm. Gasoline only becomes branded at a 
terminal’s truck rack or tanks, where proprietary additives are blended 
into the gasoline to differentiate one brand from another.67 
In State of New Hampshire v. Hess Corp., the State of New 
Hampshire attributed its harm to Exxon and stated that Exxon was the 
largest supplier of gasoline to New Hampshire during the damages 
period.68 The State contended that Exxon had supplied more than two 
billion gallons of gasoline, including several hundred million gallons 
of MTBE gasoline, comprising nearly 30% of the MTBE gasoline in 
New Hampshire.69 
The State argued that defendants should be assigned liability based 
on the shares of gasoline they supplied to distributors in New 
Hampshire (supplier shares). The State’s complaint asserted that 
defendants: 
knew or reasonably should have known that MTBE would be 
released into the environment and pollute the waters of the State in 
violation of New Hampshire law, would interfere with the State’s 
interest in protecting and preserving surface and groundwaters, and 
threaten public health and welfare and the environment, as has 
occurred and is continuing to occur within the State.70 
Based on these criteria, companies that did not operate a refinery during 
the relevant period were not identified as defendants. Thus, firms (e.g., 
wholesale distributors) that supplied MTBE gasoline to New 
65 Opposing Brief for State of New Hampshire on Exxon’s Appeal Issues at 14–15, State 
v. Hess Corp., 20 A.3d 212 (N.H. 2011) (No. 2013-0591).
66 Id. at 15.
67 Gasoline Explained, supra note 64.
68 Opposing Brief for Petitioner at 37, Hess, 20 A.3d 212 (N.H. 2011) (No. 2013-0591).
69 Id.
70 See State v. Hess Corp., Case No. 03-C-550, Second Amended Complaint, Jan. 15,
2008, ¶ 6. 
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Hampshire but did not refine that gasoline were not named as 
defendants. 
C. Arguments by the State and Exxon 
In response to a motion before trial in New Hampshire, the trial court 
looked to six “restatement factors”71 to determine whether a market 
share liability framework should be adopted: 
(1) The generic nature of the product; (2) the long latency period of 
the harm; (3) the inability of plaintiffs to discover which defendant’s 
product caused plaintiff’s harm; (4) the clarity of the causal 
connection between the defective product and the harm suffered by 
plaintiffs; (5) the absence of other medical or environmental factors 
that could have caused or materially contributed to the harm; and (6) 
the availability of sufficient “market share” data to support a 
reasonable apportionment of liability.72 
The court ruled that the State presented sufficient facts to establish 
the interchangeability and thus fungibility of gasoline with MTBE 
(factor 1).73 The court, however, disagreed on the long latency period 
associated with the harm caused by MTBE because of its ability to 
travel faster and farther than other chemicals (factor 2).74 The court 
sided with the State on the factor regarding plaintiff’s inability to 
identify the specific party that caused the harm because MTBE gasoline 
was commingled by retailers in storage tanks, which made it impossible 
to identify the source of discharged MTBE gasoline (factor 3).75 With 
respect to the link between the defective product and the harm suffered 
by the State, the court found the State’s economic expert’s market share 
analysis sufficiently considered data targeting the RFG counties versus 
non-RFG counties and sided with the State (factor 4).76 Finally, the 
court accepted the State’s market share data as sufficient and allowed 
the State to adopt market share liability in the proceeding (factor 6).77 
71 Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability-The 
American Law Institute’s Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
743–59 (1998). “Although ALI Restatements have no force of law on their own, they have 
had a persuasive impact on the courts.” Id. at 743. 
72 State v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266, 291–92 (N.H. 2015). 
73 Id. at 292.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 292–93.  
77 Id. at 293 (regarding factor 5, the court “noted that Exxon had not asserted that other 
factors contributed” to other environmental factors that might have contributed to harm). 
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Exxon’s position was that the trial court incorrectly adopted market 
share liability in this case even if it were an acceptable theory of 
recovery.78 Exxon filed a motion before trial asking the court to impose 
the State’s obligation to identify (1) the specific defendants that caused 
the harm; (2) the amount of damages to recover from each of them; (3) 
the timing and manner of the occurrence of the damages; and (4) the 
applicable legal theory to hold them responsible for the damages.79 The 
court denied the motion as follows: 
[R]equiring the State to allege specifically which defendant caused 
each injury would create an impossible burden given the allegations 
of commingling of MTBE and the asserted indivisible injury to the 
State of New Hampshire’s water supplies. To mandate the State to 
establish more particularized causation would essentially allow the 
defendants to seek to avoid liability because of lack of individualized 
proofs where the gravamen of the claim is . . . that all defendants 
placed gasoline containing MTBE into the stream of commerce, 
thereby causing [the State’s] injury.80 
Subsequently, the trial court issued an order concluding that market 
share liability was a reasonable method in this case, ruling that courts 
allow plaintiffs to adopt alternative theories of liability, such as market 
share liability and “commingled product theory,” in a situation where 
a plaintiff cannot identify which one of the group of parties that 
produce the same product caused harm.81 The court further clarified 
that commingled product theory would only remove the plaintiff’s 
burden to identify the specific proportion of a defendant’s site-specific 
gasoline responsible for the harm, but such information is neither 
feasible nor necessary.82 
Commingled product theory is a “modification of market share 
liability” characterized by two distinguishing features.83 First, a 
commingled product is a new blended commodity that comprises 
gaseous or liquid products produced by known manufacturers.84 
Therefore under commingled product theory, plaintiffs are required to 
identify, to the best of their knowledge, the actual defendants that 
manufactured the products that comprise the harmful commingled 
78 Id. at 291.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. (quoting the trial court). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 
378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
84 Id. at 378–79. 
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product. Because plaintiffs cannot just name all the manufacturers in a 
particular market that may be liable for the harm during the relevant 
time frame, they would need to conduct sufficient research to identify 
as many of the actual tortfeasors as possible if not all of them. Second, 
plaintiffs cannot identify the actual tortfeasors even if they are harmed 
immediately after the occurrence of contamination. In other words, a 
long latency period between the occurrence of contamination and 
recognition of harm is not required.85 
The plaintiff’s economic expert used the State’s 1996–2005 Motor 
Fuels Distributor Reports (distributor tax records filed monthly by 
licensed distributors in New Hampshire showing the amount of 
gasoline supplied in the State) to calculate Exxon’s 1996–2005 supplier 
market share in in New Hampshire.86 For the 1988–1995 period, 
however, the expert used the suppliers’ monthly sales reports to 
calculate Exxon’s 1988–1995 market share because the distributor tax 
records were not available during this time.87 According to the expert’s 
calculations, Exxon’s supplier share was 28.94% for the 1996–2005 
period and 30.1% for the 1998–1995 period.88 
Several defendants in New Hampshire v. Hess Corp. argued that 
under Sindell, market share liability must be assigned based on 
manufacturing shares.89 Not surprisingly, these were defendants whose 
refining shares were lower than their supplier shares.90 The State 
argued that manufacturing shares were unreliable.91 The long distances 
from refineries located in the U.S. Gulf, Canada, and overseas to New 
Hampshire, and the resulting commingling of the product caused there 
to be no reliable way to assign shares of gasoline consumed in New 
Hampshire based on firms’ refining shares.92 
The defendants also pointed out that the quantity of MTBE varied 
by type of gasoline.93  
85 Id. at 379. 
86 Opposing Brief for the State of New Hampshire on Exxon’s Appeal Issues at 15, State 
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266 (N.H. 2015) (No. 2013-0591), 2015 WL 13684787.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 15–16.
89 Opening Brief for Appellants Exxon Mobil Corp. & Exxonmobil Oil Corp. at 49, State
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266 (N.H. 2015) (No. 2013-0591), 2014 WL 12796091.
90 Id.
91 Opposing Brief for the State of New Hampshire, supra note 86, at 15.
92 Id.
93 Opening Brief for Appellants Exxon Mobil Corp. & Exxonmobil Oil Corp., supra
note 89, at 48. 
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They then argued that all prior court decisions applied market share 
liability only when the product was fungible: “Where the [market 
share] theory has been adopted, an absolute predicate to its application 
is that the product in question be fungible and generic in nature: that is, 
one defendant manufacturer’s product must be indistinguishable from 
the next manufacturer’s product.”94 
There is no set standard regarding when mathematical adjustments 
should be applied by the courts for calculation of market shares, so the 
products are adjusted to be fungible even if the products are 
manufactured with various amounts of harmful material.95 In a product 
liability case involving pollution of groundwater allegedly caused by 
oil refiners’ supply of MTBE gasoline,96 the court adopted market share 
liability to apportion the oil refiners’ liability even though the 
concentration of MTBE in gasoline varied from 2–15% by volume.97 
The risk of harm associated with MTBE is uniform under a market 
share scenario where the risk is measured based on the units of MTBE 
rather than the amount of gasoline sold.98 In other cases, courts have 
been reluctant to adopt the same principle. In a case alleging that 
benzene found in gasoline led to leukemia, the court determined that 
gasoline containing benzene was not fungible because the 
concentration of benzene varied from 0–5% by volume.99Similarly, in 
another case latex gloves with varying amounts of allergy-inducing 
protein were determined to be non-fungible.100 The fact that uniformity 
of risk associated with a harmful product is not clearly defined helps 
courts use the fungibility requirement to adopt market share liability 
loosely.101 
In a different case involving MTBE, the MDL Court concluded: 
MTBE-containing gasoline is a fungible product because all brands 
are interchangeable, and because different concentrations of MTBE 
in different batches of gasoline do not affect its ability to contaminate 
groundwater. As such, it is inherently difficult to identify the refiner 
that caused plaintiffs’ injuries, and indeed, may be even more 
94 In re Dow Corning Corp., 250 B.R. 298, 362–63 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
95 Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share 
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 166 (2004). 
96 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 
599 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
97 Rostron, supra note 95, at 166–67. 
98 Id. at 167. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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difficult than in DES cases because DES pills could be distinguished 
by appearance (e.g., color, shape, or size of the pills). MTBE-
containing gasoline is an indiscrete liquid commodity that mixes with 
other products during transport, and might not vary in appearance 
from batch to batch. According to plaintiffs, when it is released into 
the environment, it lacks even a chemical signature that would enable 
identification. Furthermore, because plaintiffs allege injury (i.e., 
contamination) from any amount of MTBE, defendants’ products 
present equivalent risks of harm to all plaintiffs, regardless of the 
concentration of MTBE in the gasoline.102 
Market share liability also requires a plaintiff to prove that 
defendants breached a duty to avoid an unreasonable risk of harm from 
their products.103 A plaintiff must show such conduct by defendants 
before he can proceed with a less strict standard for validating 
causation. 
In New Hampshire v. Hess Corp., the State argued that the defendant 
chose to produce and market MTBE gasoline without warning of risks 
associated with MTBE even though it could have alternatively 
produced gasoline with ethanol.104 At the conclusion of the trial, the 
trial court instructed the jury: 
Market share liability requires that the State . . . prove all the 
elements for negligence, or strict liability defect in design, or strict 
liability based on a failure to warn and that the State suffered harm. 
In addition, the State must prove the following: (1) it has identified 
enough MTBE gasoline manufacturers or suppliers in this case so 
that a substantial share of the relevant market is accounted for; and 
(2) MTBE gasoline is fungible, meaning that one manufacturer’s or 
supplier’s MTBE gasoline is interchangeable with another’s; and (3) 
the State cannot identify the manufacturer or supplier of the MTBE 
gasoline that caused the harm.105 
D. Jury Verdict, Appeal, and Final Opinion of the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court 
In its decision, the jury in New Hampshire v. Hess Corp., determined 
that the State had substantiated all of its claims.106 The jury found that 
the State proved all three elements above (a substantial number of 
102 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 
348, 376–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
103 State v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266, 292 (N.H. 2015). 
104 Opposing Brief for the State of New Hampshire, supra note 86, at 11. 
105 Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d at 298–99. 
106 Id. at 297. 
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MTBE gasoline manufacturers were identified, “MTBE gasoline is 
fungible,” and the State is unable to identify the source of the MTBE 
gasoline found in polluted water).107 
The jury assigned liability based on supplier shares of all gasoline 
rather than refining shares.108 The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
affirmed the superior court’s ruling that the jury properly held Exxon 
responsible for its share of the supply market and not the refining 
market.109 The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the trial 
court’s reasoning that the jury properly found Exxon responsible for its 
supply of MTBE gasoline even though it did not refine all of its MTBE 
gasoline supply.110 Exxon should have been aware of the harm 
associated with MTBE as a refiner.111 According to the trial court, the 
jury could have measured the State’s damages based on both supplier 
and market share estimates because they both represented Exxon’s 
“creation of the risk” in the State of New Hampshire.112 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed with the jury’s 
findings based on sufficient evidence.113 The court concluded that the 
judicial system is willing to compensate plaintiffs who would be left 
uncompensated because of extreme difficulty to identify the exact 
tortfeasor.114 
III 
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY THEORY APPLIED IN OTHER 
LITIGATION 
In this section, we explore the possible uses of market share liability 
applied to other litigation matters. We conclude that market share 
liability may provide valid damages estimates in a variety of different 
types of litigation. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 299. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 297. 
114 Id. 
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A. DPT Vaccine 
In Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories,115 the plaintiff sued DPT 
manufacturers for brain damage due to toxins in a vaccine that 
allegedly caused encephalitis.116The plaintiff claimed that the 
manufacturer could have made a vaccine without toxins.117 Shackil 
could not identify the exact manufacturer of the DPT that caused injury 
and thus sued all manufacturers.118 
The defendant vaccine manufacturers disagreed with the 
applicability of market share liability in this case, arguing that their 
vaccines were not really fungible based on the differences in biological 
characteristics resulting from various manufacturing processes.119 
Siding with the defendants, the trial court dismissed the case, but the 
appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the 
case for further proceedings with more evidence.120 
The appellate court found that similar physical appearance and 
identical production processes were not necessary factors for market 
share liability or any type of proportional liability theory.121 The court 
found that all brands of the vaccine allegedly had some chance of 
defect, and the chemical composition of the vaccine hardly mattered to 
a consumer.122 In the court’s view, differences in chemical composition 
were insignificant as a physically distinguishing factor.123 Defendant 
Eli Lilly, for instance, claimed that it differentiated its DPT vaccine by 
manufacturing it through a patented centrifugal process.124 Its DPT 
vaccine was comprised partially of an acellular form of pertussis 
vaccine and allegedly had a significantly lower risk of injuring 
consumers than the vaccine in whole-cell forms produced by other 
manufacturers.125 
115 Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 530 A.2d 1287 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), rev’d, 561 
A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989). 
116 Rostron, supra note 95, at 175. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 175–76. 
122 Id. at 176. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
238 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 34, 219 
The appellate court evaluated the applicability of a type of 
proportional liability because the DPT vaccines were not subject to 
uniform risk.126 The “risk-modified market share analysis” expressed 
in the court’s opinion starts with apportioning a certain defendant 
manufacturer’s liability based on its market share, but then its liability 
share is adjusted down if it provides evidence that its vaccine caused 
fewer occurrences of encephalitis.127 The trial judge was directed to 
apply such a risk-based method to apportion liability.128 
Eventually the case went to the Supreme Court of New Jersey and 
was reversed and dismissed.129 The court ignored without any 
explanation the proportional share liability theory expressed by the 
appellate court and treated the simple market share liability approach 
as the only valid approach in its analysis.130 The Supreme Court 
essentially found that the DPT vaccine was not a fungible product 
because Eli Lilly’s proprietary manufacturing process made its vaccine 
significantly less likely to cause encephalitic injuries according to the 
scientific literature cited by the court.131 
The Supreme Court concluded that market share liability would be 
potentially applicable if Eli Lilly were excluded because the other five 
manufacturers all produced their vaccines using whole-cell 
processes.132 Nonetheless, the court found there was already a federal 
statutory compensation scheme for those harmed by vaccines and 
denied allocation of liability.133 Shortly after the Sindell case, a 
California appellate court declined application of market share liability 
in Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co.134 In that case, the plaintiff claimed that 
she was harmed by an unsafe antipolio vaccine and could not identify 
the exact defendant that manufactured the vaccine.135 The antipolio 
vaccine manufacturers in the Sheffield case did not have the same 
chance of harming the consumers because the defect was attributable 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 177. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 177–78. 
132 Id. at 179. 
133 Id. 
134 Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
135 Andrew B. Nace, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of a Decade-Old 
Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395, 416 (1991). 
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to the manufacturing process of one company and not to the design.136 
Market share liability in this context would have imposed financial 
liability on innocent manufacturers.137 
A few years later, a federal district court in California allowed the 
case Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co. to proceed with market share 
liability.138 The plaintiff in this case claimed that he was harmed by a 
DPT vaccine.139 The court felt it was reasonable to loosen the 
requirement for the causation link in the DPT vaccine case, which 
differs significantly from the polio vaccine case.140 The court held in 
Morris that the DPT vaccines made by all the defendants were 
potentially faulty and that they failed to take proper care in 
manufacturing and marketing activities related to the vaccine.141 The 
court found each defendant responsible for the damages represented by 
its share of the market in which it was negligent.142 The court, however, 
did not consider the two issues that influenced the decision made by 
the Sheffield court: (1) the factor associated with the long passage of 
time considered in Sindell, and (2) the risk of preventing further 
development of vaccines.143 Morris has not been followed by courts 
outside California.144 
B. Asbestos Brake Pads 
Efforts to apply market share liability in litigation involving asbestos 
generally have not succeeded. Most courts have found that asbestos and 
DES significantly differ in ways that make market share liability 
inappropriate for calculating damages in asbestos litigation.145 For 
example, in 210 East 86th Street Corp. v. Combustion Engineering, 
Inc., the court denied application of market share liability on the 
grounds that asbestos was not fungible in a manner similar to DES.146 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
139 Nace, supra note 135, at 417. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 417. 
142 Id. at 417–18. 
143 See id. at 418. 
144 Id. 
145 Frank J. Giliberti, Emerging Trends for Products Liability: Market Share Liability, 
Its History and Future, 15 TOURO L. REV. 719, 726 (1999). 
146 210 E. 86th St. Corp. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
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In addition, the court contrasted the wide range of toxicities and their 
effects caused by different types of asbestos products.147 The court also 
contrasted the differing chemical compositions present in asbestos 
products against the uniform physical attributes and chemical 
composition characteristics of DES.148 Finally, the court addressed the 
difficulty with defining the relevant market for asbestos products 
because of their range of shapes, purposes, and functions.149 
However, market share liability was accepted in the California case 
Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, which involved asbestos brake 
pads.150 This product liability action was initiated by mechanics who 
allegedly suffered from asbestos fibers inhaled from brake pads on 
which they worked.151 The court found that the asbestos brake pads met 
the fungibility standard and allowed the mechanics to proceed in their 
action with market share liability.152 The court found that asbestos 
brake pads were highly similar, and that all the asbestos brake pads 
contained approximately the same amount of chrysotile.153 The 
plaintiffs had most exposure to asbestos fibers from brake products 
when they were inspecting or replacing the old pads.154 While the 
identity of the manufacturer of a new brake pad is easily determined by 
markings on the pad, it is difficult or impossible to identify the 
manufacturer of a used brake pad because the markings generally are 
unreadable.155 
The court in Wheeler crafted a damages award that attempted to 
account for the fact that the defective products were not perfectly 
fungible due to risk variances caused by different amounts of harmful 
substances.156 A solution to this issue would be to adjust the 
defendants’ market shares based on the differences in the degrees of 
risk. Given equal market shares, a defendant that makes pads with 60% 
asbestos should pay more in damages than a manufacturer that makes 
pads with 40% asbestos. Such a damages award would require having 
147 Giliberti, supra note 145.  
148 Id.  
149 Id. 
150 Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 109–10 (1992). 
151 Giliberti, supra note 145, at 727. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Rostron, supra note 95, at 181. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
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experts calculate specific risks associated with the various types of 
asbestos pads. 
C. Lead Paint 
1. Skipworth v. Lead Industries Ass’n
Victims suffering from lead poisoning in their childhood typically
cannot identify the particular lead paint or lead pigment manufacturers 
that caused the poisoning. In Skipworth v. Lead Industries Ass’n, the 
lead poisoning victim’s guardians sued virtually all the lead pigment 
manufacturers.157 The lead pigment was considered to be the harmful 
component of the paint used in the victim’s house.158 The relevant time 
frame during which the paint was sold was identified as 1870 to 
1977.159 The victim’s house was built in 1870, and lead paint was no 
longer used in homes by 1977.160 There was no information regarding 
when the house had been painted, the manufacturer of the paint, or the 
manufacturer of the pigment in the paint.161 In addition, lead pigment 
has no chemical characteristics that are traceable.162 
The case was eventually argued before the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania. The court identified two major factors in the market 
share liability approach in this case that would cause distortion in 
liability allocation.163 First, the court identified the lead pigment, rather 
than the paint made with the pigment, as the harmful product.164 
Second, the court found that the over one hundred-year time period was 
too long because many manufacturers have entered and exited the 
market.165 Using a market share liability approach would improperly 
hold certain pigment manufacturers liable who were not tortfeasors.166 
157 Williams ex rel. Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 690 A.2d 169, 171 (Pa. 1997). 
158 Donald G. Gifford & Paolo Pasicolan, Market Share Liability Beyond DES Cases: 
The Solution to the Causation Dilemma in Lead Paint Litigation?, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 115, 128 
(2006). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Williams ex rel. Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 690 A.2d 169, 172 (Pa. 1997). 
164 Id. at 173. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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For these reasons, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected 
application of market share liability in the Skipworth case.167 
2. Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co.
In Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., the trial court originally
allowed market share liability, but the appellate court reversed and 
rejected that approach.168 Plaintiffs commenced a legal action against 
manufacturers of white lead pigment, alleging that the infant plaintiff 
was harmed by the white lead pigment in the paint applied on his 
house.169 Plaintiffs asserted a market share liability theory as a means 
of damages recovery.170 The Supreme Court of New York in Erie 
County found that the plaintiffs could not have identified the 
manufacturers that made the white lead pigment in the paint applied on 
their house because all white lead pigment had the same chemical 
characteristics.171 White lead pigment was sold in the market as a 
generic product.172 The court found that market share liability was 
applicable in this context where there was difficulty with identification 
of the tortfeasors because of the fungible nature of the product.173 
The defendant manufacturers of white lead pigment for paint 
appealed the Erie County Supreme Court’s order denying their partial 
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s assertion of market share 
liability.174 The appellate court denied the applicability of market share 
liability for the following reasons: 
(1) white lead carbonate was not the only type of lead pigment used 
in lead paint;  
(2) white lead carbonate was used for exterior residential paint or 
non-residential paint as well as interior residential paint; 
(3) plaintiffs were unable to tell when the lead paint was applied to 
their apartment; 
(4) lead-based paint was not the only product that contains lead 
pigments; 
167 Id.  
168 Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 12596/93, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 440, at 
*6–7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 1999); Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848,
854 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
169 Brenner, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 440, at *1. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at *3–4. 
172 Id. at *4.  
173 Id. at *6–7. 
174 Brenner, 699 N.Y.S.2d at 848. 
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(5) lead-based paint contains varying concentrations of lead pigment 
and thus was not fungible; 
(6) white lead carbonate suppliers did not have direct control over 
the risk of harm associated with lead paint;  
(7) lead poisoning was not associated with one type of disease; and  
(8) the Legislature did not provide for a remedy sought by plaintiffs 
who claimed lead poisoning.175 
Therefore, the appellate court granted the defendants’ partial motion 
for summary judgment on plaintiff’s assertion of market share 
liability.176 
The appellate court in Brenner found that lead pigment is not 
fungible.177 The court did not interpret fungibility as “functional 
interchangeability” and found that lead pigments are physically 
distinguishable on an extremely detailed level because there are 
differences among the types of lead pigments used by various 
manufacturers.178 The court also found that lead pigments are not 
fungible based on varying proportions of lead pigment in paints made 
by various manufacturers which translate into various levels of risk.179 
According to the court, the finished paint products with lead pigment 
concentration ranging from 10–50% made by various manufacturers 
were not fungible.180  
3. Thomas v. Mallett
The facts surrounding the Wisconsin Supreme Court case Thomas v.
Mallett were very similar to those in Skipworth.181 In Thomas, the 
plaintiff was permitted to seek damages from lead paint pigment 
manufacturers in trial even though the plaintiff was not able to identify 
the particular manufacturer responsible for injury.182 The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in Thomas concluded that lead pigment was fungible.183 
The court’s logic was that because any pigments in paint, including 
lead pigments, are one of the two essential elements that comprise 
175 Id. at 852–53. 
176 Id. at 854. 
177 Id. at 853. 
178 Gifford & Pasicolan, supra note 158, at 148. 
179 Id. at 148–49. 
180 Id. at 148. 
181 See Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 528–29 (Wis. 2005). 
182 Gifford & Pasicolan, supra note 158, at 134. 
183 Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 561. 
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paint, they are “functionally interchangeable.”184 The court concluded 
that lead paint pigments are “physically indistinguishable” because 
they can be distinguished only on an extremely detailed level.185 Lastly, 
the court concluded that lead paint pigments are equally risky because 
they contain similar proportions of lead which is the common toxic 
material.186 
The Thomas decision expanded the market share liability doctrine in 
one important respect. The decision removed the requirement that 
defendants’ products be chemically identical.187 Instead, the court in 
Thomas concluded that liability should be based on whether 
defendants’ products are “(1) functionally interchangeable, (2) 
physically indistinguishable, and (3) identically defective.”188 
Although the court cited the market share liability analysis of Professor 
Rostron,189 Professor Rostron argued that the first two factors were not 
necessary.190 Moreover, Professor Rostron argued in favor of 
“proportional and collective liability” under which defendants’ 
products need not be identically defective but rather could be applied 
where defendants’ products impose varying degrees of risk.191 
D. Factor VIII Blood Products 
Several cases involving nonrecombinant Commercial Factor VIII 
blood products have successfully adopted the market share liability 
framework. Factor VIII is a natural protein present in human blood that 
governs clotting and coagulation.192 Factor VIII previously was 
obtained from individual blood donors, fractionalized to remove 
plasma, and provided to patients with hemophilia.193 Unfortunately, a 
large number of Factor VIII products were infected by the HIV virus 
during the 1980s.194 As with the DES cases, the hemophiliac patients 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 562. 
187 Gifford & Pasicolan, supra note 158, at 135. 
188 Id. 
189 See generally Rostron, supra note 95, at 196–98 (arguing that in some cases, courts 
mistakenly rejected market share liability on the basis of a finding that the products in 
question were not sufficiently fungible). 
190 Gifford & Pasicolan, supra note 158, at 135. 
191 Rostron, supra note 95, at 157–59. 
192 Daniel J. Grimm, Accounting for Risk Disparity: An Alternative to Market Share 
Liability, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 549, 554 (2006). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 554–55. 
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who were harmed by infected Factor VIII products had difficulty 
identifying the tortfeasor.195 In addition, Factor VIII consumers often 
did not learn they had been harmed by the blood product until long after 
it had been administered to them.196 
The courts in two cases against nonrecombinant Factor VIII 
producers adopted market share liability. The Supreme Court of Hawaii 
in Smith v. Cutter Biological adopted a broad version of market share 
liability based on Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.197 The court was not 
swayed by the fact that other courts had refused to adopt the theory of 
market share liability in non-DES litigation.198 The court stated that 
new principles of causation would be necessary to compensate innocent 
plaintiffs harmed by Factor VIII products.199 The court in Smith 
followed Hymowitz and allocated defendants’ liability based on their 
national market shares.200 The Hymowitz court’s logic for adopting the 
national market was that each defendant’s share in the national market 
reflects its overall culpability.201 The court in Smith also considered 
Factor VIII to be fungible in the sense that “it can be used 
interchangeably” and found that market share liability theory applied 
in the DES cases “helpful.”202 
Similarly, in Ray v. Cutter Laboratories, a federal court in Florida 
approved the use of market share liability as applied to Factor VIII 
producers as long as the plaintiff demonstrated a sufficient effort to 
identify the tortfeasors.203 Unlike in DES and other cases involving 
products that have equal chances of defect, adoption of market share 
liability in the cases involving Factor VIII must take into account the 
fact that differing manufacturing processes used to produce Factor VIII 
pose varying degrees of risk.204 
As noted earlier, the court in Ray v. Cutter Laboratories determined 
that market share liability could be adopted in litigation involving 
195 Id. at 555. 
196 Id. 
197 Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 728 (Haw. 1991). 
198 Klein, supra note 11, at 910. 
199 Id. at 910–11. 
200 Id. at 911. 
201 Id. 
202 Smith, 823 P.2d 717 at 724. 
203 See Ray v. Cutter Labs., 754 F. Supp. 193, 195–96 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
204 Grimm, supra note 192, at 556. 
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Factor VIII products.205 This ruling came out before the decision in 
Smith v. Cutter Laboratories.206 However, a different federal district 
court in Florida declined the adoption of market share liability the 
following year in Kellar v. Cutter Laboratories.207 The court in this 
case disagreed with the decision in Ray v. Cutter Laboratories; it found 
that the Ray court did not consider the varying degrees of risk 
associated with the Factor VIII products made by different 
manufacturers.208 
Unlike the consumers in the DES cases, the consumers of Factor 
VIII products face a nonuniform risk of injury. While DES is uniformly 
harmful, Factor VIII is not harmful by nature, rather it is harmful only 
when infected blood enters the manufacturing process.209 The degree 
of risk can vary depending on many factors, such as where plasma is 
collected by the manufacturer and how high the level of quality control 
is in the manufacturing process.210 On the other hand, DES is uniformly 
dangerous to every fetus due to its chemical composition.211 
The court in King v. Cutter Laboratories also found that Factor VIII 
products are not composed in the same way partly because every 
manufacturer makes its factor concentrate through its own proprietary 
process.212 The court declined the use of market share liability in this 
Factor VIII case on the ground that not every unit of Factor VIII posed 
the same level of risk of defect because not every unit of Factor VIII 
was equally infectious.213 The court found that the risk of defect 
associated with Factor VIII was not attributable to the product’s natural 
characteristics but was related to the way it was processed.214 
205 Ray, 754 F. Supp. 193 at 196. 
206 Klein, supra note 11, at 910 n.145. 
207 Kellar v. Cutter Labs., No. 88-14059-C1V-RYSKAMP, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 
24, 1992). 
208 Klein, supra note 11, at 910 n.145. 
209 Grimm, supra note 192, at 562. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 King v. Cutter Labs., Div. of Miles, Inc., 685 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996). 
213 Grimm, supra note 192, at 562–63. 
214 Id. at 563. 
2019] Market Share Liability: Lessons from 247 
New Hampshire v. Exxon Mobil 
E. Orbital Debris 
Growth in the amount of orbital debris has resulted in numerous 
collisions.215 Given the rate of increase in the volume of debris, the 
increasing costs of collisions are likely to adversely affect the growth 
of the satellite industry.216 
Applying market share liability in the context of orbital debris has 
been suggested, but specific methods of assigning market share liability 
in potential orbital debris litigation have yet to be developed.217 A 
major challenge with applying market share liability in the orbital 
debris context relates to determining each launching party’s share in 
the existing problematic debris.218 Estimating the total mass of orbital 
debris through statistical and mathematical methods is feasible.219 
However, determining the percentage of the total mass attributable to a 
given party is difficult.220 
In principle, the shares of the total mass of debris that can be tracked 
back to specific parties could be used to assign shares of the remaining, 
untraceable debris.221 Untraceable debris is composed primarily of 
pieces of debris generated in collisions and explosions of larger pieces 
of debris.222 Thus, smaller pieces of debris are the products of larger 
pieces of debris. Therefore, if a percentage of large pieces of traceable 
debris belongs to a certain party, it can be inferred that approximately 
the same percentage of smaller, untraceable debris likely belongs to the 
same party.223  
According to NASA, there were 17,817 identified objects in Earth 
orbit as of October 4, 2016.224 Of this total, 5699 objects belonged to 
the United States, 6354 to Russia, and 3782 to China.225 This means 
that the contribution indices associated with the United States, Russia, 
and China were 32.0%, 35.7%, and 21.2% respectively. The remaining 
215 Mark J. Sundahl, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability 
Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 126 (2000). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 127. 
218 Id. at 144. 
219 Id. 
220 Id.  
221 Id. at 144–45. 
222 Id. at 145. 
223 Id. 
224 NASA, Satellite Box Score, 20 NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS 16, 16 (Oct. 2016). 
225 Id.  
248 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 34, 219 
11.1% was attributable to other countries including France, Japan, and 
India.226 The dollar amount of each party’s damages could be calculated 
by multiplying the total damages amount by the share of the party’s 
traceable debris.227 
IV 
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY THEORY MAY NOT APPLY IN SOME 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
Courts likely will have an increasing role in handling disputes 
relating to the effects of climate change caused in part by producers of 
carbon dioxide (CO2). According to a 2007 decision by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency,228 the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to control air pollution 
caused by CO2 emissions from motor vehicles.229 Although the 
consequences of legal disputes involving global warming are presently 
uncertain, these types of disputes likely will increase in the future. 
More parties will be inclined to commence tort litigation as more types 
of damages are recognized as being caused by global warming.230 
Recent studies have found a stronger correlation between global 
warming and cumulative CO2 emissions rather than current CO2 
emissions. For example, Leduc, Matthews, and de Elía found a linear 
relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions and regional change in 
the temperatures except in certain high-latitude regions.231 Richard 
Heede concludes that the current trend of global warming is primarily 
attributed to historic emissions rather than current emissions.232 
Therefore, the greenhouse gas producer who currently produces the 
highest share of greenhouse gas is not necessarily the most responsible 
for global warming. 
A damages system based on market share liability is not particularly 
suitable for tort claims related to global warming because market share 
liability imposes only several liability. Current CO2 emissions 
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producers make ongoing contributions to cumulative climate change 
and may reflect a relatively small share of total CO2 emissions caused 
by producers over several centuries. Such discrepancies in shares of 
current and historical CO2 emissions producers are especially relevant 
as the economic rationale for damages is to correct the incentives of 
market actors presently creating negative externalities. Therefore, 
assessing damages through market share liability based on historical 
shares may not properly incentivize current CO2 emissions producers 
to change their behavior. 
A more appropriate allocation of liability in the context of CO2 
emissions would be to use the defendants’ market share as a proof of 
substantial causation, a common form of proof of causation that 
supports both joint and several liability, as well as punitive damages.233 
In handling disputes relating to climate change, courts rely heavily on 
climate science, which may establish the causal link between 
defendants’ actions and plaintiffs’ claim. Without such causal link, a 
court would find that plaintiffs lack standing to sue and would have to 
dismiss the lawsuit.234 
A damages theory based on joint and several liability is particularly 
suitable for tort claims related to CO2 emissions because it gives each 
defendant more incentive to minimize its ongoing greenhouse gas 
emissions to avoid exposure to joint liability. Under joint and several 
liability in a tort claim, any one of the defendants can be entirely 
responsible for the payment of the total damages before allocating the 
other defendants their shares in the total damages.235 Joint and several 
liability would provide significant incentive to reduce CO2 emissions, 
as estimates of damages associated with climate change are 
significant.236 For example, a 2017 study estimating economic damages 
due to climate change in the U.S. adopts a “probabilistic” and 
“empirically derived” damages model that “integrates climate science, 
econometric analyses, and process models.”237 This damages model 
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estimates that every increase of one degree Celsius in the average 
temperature causes market, and nonmarket, damage in the U.S. equal 
to approximately 1.2% of gross domestic product.238 
This type of damages approach was adopted in the New York City 
MTBE case in which both the trial court and the Second Circuit 
approved the use of market share as circumstantial evidence of actual 
causation of the plaintiff’s injury.239 The court found the defendant 
Exxon liable because of “evidence linking its own product to the 
plaintiff’s injury.”240 The court concluded that 
[v]iewed in context, the market share data adduced by the City served 
merely as some proof that sufficient quantities of Exxon gasoline 
were delivered to gas stations in the vicinity of Station Six to make it 
more likely than not that Exxon gasoline played a substantial role in 
bringing about the City’s injury. Like the District Court, we perceive 
a difference between employing market-share data in this fashion and 
imposing liability based solely on a defendant’s share of the market 
for a dangerous product, absent any evidence that the defendant’s 
own product directly caused some of the harm alleged. Here, the City 
did not use market share data as a substitute for showing that Exxon 
contributed to the contamination of Station Six. Instead, it used such 
data to help quantify the scope of that contribution.241 
To apply substantial causation in a global warming damages context, 
defendants’ quantified CO2 emissions could be used as proof of the 
degree of contribution to damages. For example, Heede conducted a 
study of historic CO2 and methane emissions attributable to the ninety 
largest producers of fossil fuels and cement. In this study, these ninety 
entities (fifty investor-owned, thirty-one state-owned, and nine current 
or former centrally planned states) were selected because they 
produced equal to or greater than the threshold level of eight million 
tons of carbon per year for fossil fuel production.242 These ninety 
entities are headquartered in forty-three countries and consist of fifty-
six crude oil and natural gas producers, thirty-seven coal extractors, and 
seven cement producers.243
The study found that 914 billion tons of CO2 equivalent gas were 
generated by the ninety entities between the years 1854 and 2010, 
which accounts for 63% of all the industrial CO2 and methane 
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generated worldwide between the years 1751 and 2010.244 This means 
that 37% of all the industrial CO2 and methane generated worldwide 
between 1751 and 2010 is attributable to other entities that have not 
been identified in this study. Heede identifies the ninety entities and 
their respective production of fuels and cement, CO2, methane, and 
total CO2 equivalent emissions from 1854 to 2010, as well as each of 
the ninety entities’ share of the global CO2 equivalent emissions 
generated from 1751 to 2010.245 
CONCLUSION 
Negative externalities are pervasive in today’s modern economy. 
Economic efficiency requires, and public policies attempt to ensure, 
that polluting firms internalize the costs they impose on society. In 
many instances, however, tracking a pollutant back to its source can be 
difficult or impossible. In such circumstances, market share liability 
may serve as a viable method with which to assign damages. In other 
circumstances (e.g., global warming litigation) the alternative 
methodology of substantial causation may better serve to ensure that 
polluting firms internalize the costs they impose on society. 
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